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AIRLINE DEREGULATION: ANOTHER LOOK
BY

DR. EDWARD

A. MORASH*

I.

INTRODUCTION

INCE OVER FIVE years have elapsed from the passage
of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (Act)' and
since the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) went out of existence on January 1, 1985,2 the time has come to take another look at the effects of airline deregulation. The Act
represented the culmination of a long debate over the efficacy of CAB regulation of the airline industry, particularly
in regard to rates and market entry. 3 This legislation substituted a new policy of open entry and flexible pricing for
the airlines while gradually phasing out the CAB. 4 The
proponents of deregulation believed that under such a
policy, the airlines would become more efficient and profitable, airline labor would gain more employment opportunities, and consumers would benefit from lower fares. 5
The initial experiences under deregulation were quite
* Assistant Professor of Transportation Law; Graduate School of Management,
College of Business Administration; Kent State University.
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(amending Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1982)).
2 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1551(a) (1982).
3 The Autumn 1975 issue of theJOURNAL OF AIR LAW & COMMERCE was devoted
to this debate. See 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 573, 573-883 (1975).
Under the "sunset provisions" of the Act, the CAB's authority over routes
expired on December 31, 1981, it's control over rates and mergers ended on January 1, 1983, and the CAB itself went out of existence onJanuary 1, 1985. See 49
U.S.C. § 1551(a) (1982).
5 See, e.g., Rakowski &Johnson, Airline Deregulation: Problems and Prospects, 19 Q.
REV. ECON. & Bus. 69, 77 (1979); Miller, A Perspective on Airline Regulatory Reform,
41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 679 (1975); Simat, Helliesen, & Eicher, The Effects of Route
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favorable.6 Airline load factors increased substantially
following the Act, and airline profitability by the end of
1978 reached its highest level in over thirty years. 7
Although profitability for major airlines fell off in 1979
(Table 1), the major airlines continued to institute more
efficient practices and to improve load factors.8 Furthermore, the smaller national airlines9 continued to enjoy
record profits through 1981 (Table 1). In fact, during this
period it was also becoming apparent that the nationals
were gaining significant market shares at the expense of
the majors. Thus, by 1982 the nationals held 13 percent
of the American market compared to 8 percent in pre-deregulation periods,' 0 a development which some observers considered favorable."
Despite the early successes of deregulation, the 1980's
brought serious doubts about the desirability of complete
deregulation.' 2 Table 1 shows that although both the maRestriction Removal and DiscretionaryAuthority, REGULATION OF PASSENGER FARES AND
COMPETITION AMONG THE AIRLINES 177 (1977).

THE EARLY EXPERIENCE U. Meyer & C. Oster, Jr. eds.
6 AIRLINE DEREGULATION:
1982); Breyer & Stein, Airline Deregulation: The Anatomy of Reform, in INSTEAD OF
REGULATION, 28, 31-33 (R. Poole, Jr. ed. 1982); Cohen, New Air Service and Deregulation: A Study in Transition, 44J. AIR L. & COM. 695, 697 (1979).

Breyer & Stein, supra note 6, at 9.
a One of the efficiency-oriented developments in the aftermath of deregulation
has been the evolution of air carriers toward "hub systems." See STANDARD AND
POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Aerospace and Air Transport, Basic Analysis, A32 (Dec. 1,
1983) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY SURVEYS].
9 As a result of the structural changes that occurred in the industry after deregulation, the CAB in 1981 altered its classification system for air carriers. For the
most part, "trunk" carriers are now classified as "major airlines" while the former
"local service" carriers are reclassified as "national carriers" (see Table 5 for examples). More specifically, the CAB defined "major airlines" as those with annual
revenues in excess of $1 billion while "national airlines" are those carriers with
annual revenues between $75 million and $1 billion. For a discussion of this classification system, see AIRLINE ECONOMICS xxiv (G. James ed. 1982).
10 INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at 32.
7

1 Graham & Kaplan, Airline Deregulation is Working, REGULATION, May-June

1982, at 26.
12 See, e.g., Rose, Three Years After Airline Passenger Deregulation in the United States:
A Report Card on Trunkline Carriers, 21 TRANS. J. 51, 57 (1981); Farris, The Multiple
Meanings and Goals of Deregulation: A Commentary, 21 TRANSJ. 44, 49 (198 1);James,
The Coming Decade in Commercial Aviation, in AIRLINE ECONOMICS 190 (G. James ed.

1982).
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TABLE 1
AIRLINE COMPOSITE FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE BY CARRIER TYPE
(1973-1983)
12 Major Airlines

Passenger Load
Factor (%)

1973

1975

1976 1977

1978

1979

1981 1982

52.4

53.5

55.5

55.5

60.3

62.7

58.0

a

58.8

1983
60.1

Net Profit Margin

(%)

1.5

Neg.

2.0

3.3

5.1

1.5

Neg. Neg.

Neg.

% Earned on
Total Capital

3.5

1.0

5.5

8.0

10.6

4.4

Neg. Neg.

Neg.

Long-term debtto-equityb

1.43

1.36

1.13

1.17

2.66

3.41

4.02

1980

1981

1982

1983

.91

1.06

8 National Arilines

1. Passenger Load
Factor (%)

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978 1979

56.5

55.4

57.1

60.2

60.8

58.6

59.7

57.9

58.3

50.3

54.7

2.

Net Profit Margin
(%)

1.3

3.7

Neg.

3.0

3.8

5.1

5.3

4.3

3.7

Neg.

Neg.

3.

% Earned on
Total Capital

5.9

9.7

1.3

8.0

9.2

10.5

10.7

9.5

8.8

Neg.

Neg.

4.

Long-term debtto-equityb

3.6

2.8

2.9

1.41

1.35

1.81

1.42

3.0

3.4

Source:

1.33

1.44

Ratios calculated from THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT Suav., Ratings and Reports, Part III
(various years).
Neg. = Negative
aBraniff and Continental deleted for 1982 and 1983.
bCarriers in particular financial difficulty bias the ratios upward.
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jor and national carriers have continued to exhibit high
load factors13 in the post-deregulation period, the majors
have experienced four years of negative profit margins as
well as negative or nonexistent earnings on total invested
capital. Furthermore, for 1982 and 1983, the small nationals have also lapsed into the non-profit category (Table 1) with indications that the majors are now meeting
the nationals head-on in the latter's markets.' 4 The most
recent 1982-1983 airline performance is particularly
troubling since fuel costs steadily declined during this period,' 5 since airlines obtained significant wage concessions from7 labor,' 6 and since the economy steadily
improved.1
The recent post-deregulation period has also brought a
serious deterioration in the capital structures of the major
and national airlines. Thus, Table 1 shows that by 1982
and 1983, both major and national airlines had record
levels of long-term debt in their capital structures.
Although an airline debt to equity ratio of 1 to 1 is often
considered desirable,' 8 in 1983 the majors (excluding
Braniff and Continental) had an average ratio of over 4 to
1, while the nationals had a ratio of over 3 to 1. Furthermore, unlike the pre-deregulation period, the majors,
which handle the bulk of industry traffic, now have a
higher debt ratio than the nationals (see Table 1). 19
13 Load factor is defined as the percentage of seats occupied by revenue passengers in an airplane in relation to the total seats available for loading. See Brenner,
The Significance of Airline Passenger Load Factors, in AIRLINE ECONOMICS 35 (G. James
ed. 1982).
14 In addition, airlines are becoming less cooperative with their computerized

reservation systems. See INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at A34.

15The decline in fuel prices began in the middle of 1981 and since then has
declined about 20 percent to eighty-five cents per gallon as of August 1983. See id.
at A29.
16Id. at A42-A43.
17 id. at A29.
18 Id. at A40.
19While some observers might consider firm capital structure as a management
policy variable, it is also true that managerial policy decisions are constrained by
environmental conditions and available choices. See Gritta, Bankruptcy Risks Facing
the Major U.S. Airlines, 48J. AIR L. & COM. 89, 91-97 (1982); N. TANEJA, AIRLINES
IN TRANSITION

176-78 (1981).
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Although the data in Table 1 may be cause for concern,
the data may not fully reflect the prospects of the airline
industry in a deregulated environment. For example, a
period of transitional adjustment could be expected to occur along with a "shakeout" of some inefficient firms. ° In
addition, recessionary conditions over the last several
years have also undoubtedly had an adverse impact on airline finances.
A better gauge of airline prospects can be had by recourse to capital market performance. Since the "efficient
markets" theory states that capital markets are both future
oriented and efficient, 2 1 the use of securities market data
to measure the long-term effects of regulatory change is
an increasingly popular methodology. 22 According to the
"efficient markets" concept, the price of a firm's securities
fully and promptly reflects all publicly available information relevant to the firm; this price behavior is, therefore,
an unbiased assessment of a firm's future risk and return
potentialities. 2
The present study focuses on the capital market's assessment of the airline industry's prospects in a deregulated environment. After briefly discussing the
methodology in the next section of this paper,24 section
III will present the results of the analysis.2 5 Section IV
Miller, The Effects of the Administration'sDraft Bill on Air CarrierFinances, in REGU(1977);
Gomez-Ibanez, Oster, & Pickrell, Airline Deregulation: What's Behind the Recent Losses,
in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, CONFERENCE ON REGULATORY
20

LATION OF PASSENGER FARES AND COMPETITION AMONG THE AIRLINES 200

214A (June 1983).
There is a great deal of empirical support for this theory. See, e.g., Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383-423
(1970); R. ROBINSON & D. WRIGHTSMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE ACCUMULAREFORM IN SURFACE TRANSPORT
21

TION AND ALLOCATION OF WEALTH 400-02 (1974); W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY

AND CAPITAL MARKETS 77-103 (1970).
22 Schwert, Using FinancialData to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J. L. & ECON.
121-22 (1981); Cavarra, Stover, & Allen, The Capital Market Effects of Airline Deregulation, 20 TRANS. J. 73 (1981); Davis, Cunningham, & Tabor, The Impact of Regulatory Reform and Other Uncertainties on the Airline Stocks: An Analysis of Recent Investor
Sentiment, 21 TRANS. FORUM 157 (1980).
23

See supra note 21.

24

See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.

25 See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
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will then provide a discussion of the results and offer explanations for the findings. 6 The final two sections of the
paper will present some proposals for the future, the
overall conclusions, and policy implications for the airline
industry. 7
II.

METHODOLOGY

In order to evaluate investor sentiment toward deregulation and the future of the airline industry, a "before and
after" research design was employed with two phases. In
the first phase, airline bond yields to maturity28 were compared with three composite "benchmark" indices both
before and after deregulation. Bond yields were utilized
since debt instruments have been the major source of external funds for the airline industry in the past and are
likely to continue to be so in the future. 9 In an efficient
market, as prospects for the airline industry improve, investors would be expected to bid up the price of airline
bonds so that yields to maturity decline. 0 Conversely, as
the future prospects for air carriers deteriorate, the price
of airline bonds would be expected to fall so that yields to
maturity increase. Stated alternatively, a decline in airline
26

See infra notes 49-80 and accompanying text.

27

See infra notes 81-112 and accompanying text.

A bond yield to maturity can be defined as the rate of discount which makes
the present value of the stream of future interest payments, plus the return of
28

principal at maturity, equal to the current market price of the bond. It is the internal rate of return on a debt instrument held to maturity. Normally, bond yields to
maturity are found by recourse to a "yield table." Alternatively, the yield to maturity (YTM) can be approximated by the following formulas:
YTM = Annual coupon interest + (Discount/Number years to maturity)
(Current price + Par value)/2
or

YTM = Annual coupon interest -

(Premium/Number years to maturity)
(Current price + Par value)/2
"Discount" means the discount received for bonds purchased below par value and
"premium" means the additional payment for bonds purchased above par value.
SeeJ. COHEN, E. ZINBARG, & A. ZEIKEL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 406-07 (1973).
- INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at 41.
30 J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG, & A. ZEIKEL, supra note 28, at 405-06; R. ROBINSON &
D. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 21, at 400.
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yields to maturity implies both lower risk and lower future
debt costs, while a rise in yields implies higher31 investor
risk and consequently higher future debt costs.
Because general. economic conditions and the level of
interest rates also affect bond yields,3 2 it was also necessary to compare airline yields over time to "benchmark"
indices. The three indices selected were Moody's composite of all corporate bonds, a composite of motor carrier bonds, and a composite of rail bonds.3 3 The selection
of a general market indicator as well as two transportation
indices should allow for comparison of the results and
should strengthen or weaken any conclusions achieved.
The resulting "spreads" were calculated between airline
bond yields and the corporate, motor, and rail yields over
' 4
the period 1973 through 1984. The "spread analyses' 3
were then evaluated for the pre-deregulation period
(1973-1977), the early post-deregulation period (19781980), and the recent post-deregulation period (19811984).
The second phase of the research effort was used as a
check to verify the results of the first phase. Airline bond
ratings were evaluated over time for the pre-deregulation
and post-deregulation periods. Moody's bond ratings
range from the highest rating of "Aaa" to the lowest rating of "C." While each of the nine Moody rating categories has a distinct meaning, bonds rated below "Ba" are
considered 3to5 "lack characteristics of the desirable
investment.
31 See Melicher & Rush, Systematic Risk, FinancialData, and Bond Rating Relationships in a Regulated Industry Environment, 29J. FIN. 537, 537 (1974); Hettenhouse &
Sartoris, An Analysis of the Informational Value of Bond-Ratings Changes, 16 Q. REV.
ECON. & Bus. 65, 65 (1976); West, Bond Ratings, Bond Yields, and FinancialRegulation: Some Findings, 16 J. LAw & ECON. 159, 163 (1973); Bhandari, What's in a
Change in an IndustrialBond Rating?, I IJ. Bus. RESEARCH 91, 103 (1983).
32 J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG, & A. ZEIKEL, supra note 28, at 405, 418-19.
" The data for the airlines and the corporate, motor, and rail indices were all
obtained from the same monthly editions of MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE,
MOODY'S BOND RECORD, vols. 40-51 (1973-1984).
34 SeeJ. COHEN, E. ZINBARG, & A. ZEIKEL, supra note 28, at 418-19.
35 See, e.g., MooDY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S BOND RECORD, vol. 51 no. 6,
at 1 (Aug. 1984).
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The data for airline bond yields to maturity and for
bond ratings were broken down for the major airlines and
the national airlines. The sample of air carriers consisted
of nine major airlines and six national airlines.36 Only
bonds which were outstanding for virtually the entire period were utilized in the analysis. When a firm had several
outstanding bonds, an average yield and average rating
were calculated for the individual firm for the relevant
time period.
III.

RESULTS:

SPREAD ANALYSIS AND RATINGS BEFORE
AND AFTER DEREGULATION

A. Airline Bond Yields Compared to Corporate Yields
Table 2 compares average airline bond yields to maturity with a composite of all corporate bond yields for the
pre-deregulation, early post-deregulation, and the most
recent post-deregulation periods. The "spread analysis"
in Table 2 shows that initially the bond market reacted
quite favorably to airline deregulation. That is, the
spreads between airline bond yields and the composite
corporate yields narrowed substantially during the early
post-deregulation period (1978-1980). There is also an
indication in Table 2 that the market reacted favorably to
the 1976-1977 CAB attempts at "de facto deregulation"
during the Chairmanships of Robson and Kahn,37 since
the airline/corporate spreads actually began to decline
during the 1976-1977 period. This improvement accelerS6 The major airlines included American Airlines, Braniff International, Conti-

nental Air Lines, Eastern Air Lines, Pan Am World, Trans World, United Air
Lines, U.S.Air, and Western Air Lines. The national airlines consisted of Frontier
Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, Ozark Air Lines, P.S.A., Texas International, and
World Airways.
37 For a historical review of this period, see Altshuler & Teal, The PoliticalEconomy of Airline Deregulation, in CURRENT ISSUES IN TRANSPORTATION POLICY 57 (A.
Altshuler ed. 1979); P. BIEDERMAN, THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: END OF AN ERA

111-13 (1982); R. KANE & A. VOSE, AIR TRANSPORTATION 10-11 (7th ed. 1979).
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TABLE 2
AIRLINE AVERAGE BOND YIELDS TO
MATURITY COMPARED TO
AVERAGE CORPORATE
YIELDS
(PERCENTAGES)a

Periodb

Majors' Nationals' Ave. Composite
Average
Average
Corporate
Spread Spread
Bond Yield Bond Yield
Yield
Majors' Nationals
(A)

(B)

(C)

June
June
June
June
June

(percent)
10.53
11.91
12.89
11.05
9.84

(percent)
10.29
11.95
12.47
11.55
10.18

(percent)
7.69
8.89
9.55
9.16
8.38

1978 June
1979 June
1980 June
September
December

10.26
10.94
12.08
13.70
14.92

10.54
11.76
13.00
13.51
14.60

9.13
9.81
11.64
12.80
14.04

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

(A-C)

(B-C)

(percent) (percent)
2.84
2.60
3.02
3.06
3.34
2.92
1.89
2.39
1.46
1.80
1.13
1.13
.44
.90
.88

1.41
1.95
1.36
.71
.56

1981 March
14.44
14.61
14.26
.18
.35
June
15.44
14.08
14.76
.68
-. 68
September
18.49
16.44
16.18
2.31
.26
December
17.38
15.57
15.38
2.00
.19
1982 March
18.76
19.08
15.68
3.08
3.40
June
19.12
18.57
15.77
3.35
2.80
September
17.05
16.23
14.34
2.71
1.89
December
15.08
15.76
13.02
2.06
2.74
1983 March
13.88
14.56
12.71
1.17
1.85
June
15.10
14.54
12.54
2.56
2.00
September
15.03
14.90
12.91
2.12
1.99
December
15.26
14.65
13.07
2.19
1.58
1984 March
15.18
14.52
13.33
1.85
1.19
June
15.80
15.30
14.40
1.40
.90
August
16.00
15.44
13.78
2.22
1.66
Source: Calculated from MOODY'S BOND RECORD, monthly editions.
aNonconvertible issues.
bperiod I. represents the pre-deregulation period, period II. indicates the
early post-deregulation period, while period III. represents the most recent
post-deregulation period.

262

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[50

ated during the early post-deregulation period and manifested itself for both the major airlines and the smaller
nationals, although the nationals improved at a faster rate
during the latter part of 1980 and the first part of 1981
(Table 2). It was during this period that the nationals
were surpassing the majors in earnings performance, and
it was becoming apparent that the nationals were gaining
market share at the expense of the majors.3
Despite the bond market's initial favorable reaction to
airline deregulation, a reassessment apparently began to
take place during the latter part of 1981. Table 2 shows
that beginning in the September quarter of 1981 for the
majors and the March quarter of 1982 for the nationals,
the yield spreads began to deteriorate substantially. The
deterioration in yield spreads continued throughout the
1981-1984 period at a time when airline fuel costs were
declining, 39 general interest rates were falling, 40 airlines
were increasingly able to bring labor costs under control, 4 1 and airline productivity was increasing. 42 Furthermore, during 1983-1984 the economy was making steady
progress toward recovery,43 so that Table 2 indicates that
the bond market was not imputing any advantage from an
economic upturn to the major and national airlines. In
fact, an inspection of the recent yield spreads in Table 2
indicates that airline prospects have not been as dismal
since the oil embargo/recession of 1973 to 1975.
In summary, these results suggest that in the recent
post-deregulation period (1981-1984), the bond market is
less sanguine about deregulation and the industry's future
than in the period immediately following deregulation.
38Davis, Cunningham, and Tabor, supra note 22, at 157; Ellison, The Structural
Change of the Airline Industry Following Deregulation, 21 TRANSP. J. 58, 67 (1982).
39 INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at A29, A42.
40 Id.
41 Id. at A28.
42 STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS,
Aerospace and Air Transport, Current
Analysis A2-A3, A6 (June 30, 1983)[hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Current
Analysis].
43 Id. at 2, 7.
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Furthermore, the economy expanded steadily during
1983-1984. These results imply that airline capital costs
(debt costs) have risen sharply relative to the general market during the recent post-deregulation period.
B. Airline Bond Yields Compared to Motor and Rail Yields
Table 3 compares average airline bond yields to maturity with the yields for both motor carriers and rail carriers 44 for the same time periods previously examined.
Although both motor carriers and rail carriers received
some regulatory reform in 1980,'4 the extent of deregulation was not nearly as comprehensive as that for air carriers. Motor and rail carriers are still regulated as to rates,
46
entry, and abandonment.
The results of the "spread analysis" in Table 3 are similar to the results achieved with the corporate yields in Table 2. Initially, the airline spreads declined substantially
during the early post-deregulation period (1978-1980)
from the pre-deregulation period (1973-1977). Although
the airline improvement manifested itself in both the motor and rail comparisions, the improvement over the motor yields was somewhat greater.
In contrast, during the last two quarters of 1981, the
bond market began to reassess the impact of deregulation
on the airlines' prospects. Table 3 shows that beginning
in the September quarter of 1981, the spreads between
airline yields and both motor and rail yields increased dramatically. This deterioration in airline performance continued throughout the 1981-1984 period at a time when
44 For the rail index, the 24 carriers in Moody's Rail Bond Yield Averages were
utilized. For the motor index, a sample of motor carrier bonds was selected. See
supra note 33.
45 The Motor Carrier Act was approved July 1, 1980 while the Staggers Rail Act
was approved October 14, 1980. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10521 (1982)); Staggers Rail Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101
(1982)).
46 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10766, 10903-10906, 10921-10934 (1982).
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TABLE 3
AIRLINE AVERAGE BOND YIELDS TO
MATURITY COMPARED TO
MOTOR, RAIL, AND
CORPORATE YIELDS
(PERCENTAGES)a

Time Periodb

1973
1974
1. 1975
1976
1977

June
June
June
June
June

1978 June
11. 1979 June
1980 June
1981 March
June
Sept.
Dec.
111. 1982 March
June
Sept.
Dec.
1983 March
June
Sept.
Dec.
1984 March
June
Aug.

Motor
Airline
Carrier
Average
Average Rail Averagc Spread Spread
Spread
Bond Yieldsc Bond Yields Bond Yields kir/Motor Air/Rail Air/Corporate
(A)
(B)
(C)
(A-B)
(A-C)
(A-Table 2)
(percent)
10.41
11.93
12.68
11.30
10.01

(percent)
8.35
8.93
11.77
10.15
9.14

(percent)
8.07
8.89
9.40
8.88
8.06

(percent) (percent)
2.06
2.34
3.00
3.04
.91
3.28
1.15
2.42
.87
1.95

(percent)
2.72
3.04
3.13
2.14
1.63

10.40
11.35
12.54

9.58
9.80
11.69

8.68
9.44
11.26

.82
1.55
.85

1.72
1.91
1.28

1.27
1.54
.90

13.32
14.05
14.53
14.45
13.75
14.41
13.41
12.93
12.06
12.05
12.25
12.06
12.40
13.06
13.21

12.72
13.09
13.71
13.84
14.00
13.99
13.69
12.60
12.11
11.78
12.04
12.46
12.53
13.31
13.82

1.21
.71
2.94
2.00
5.17
4.44
3.23
2.49
2.16
2.77
2.72
2.95
2.52
2.54
2.56

1.81
1.67
3.76
2.61
4.92
4.86
2.95
2.82
2.11
3.04
2.93
2.55
2.39
2.29
1.95

.27
.00
1.29
1.07
3.24
3.08
2.30
2.40
1.51
2.28
2.06
'1.94
1.59
1.20
1.99

Source: Calculated from MOODY's BOND RECORD, monthly editions.
aNonconvertible issues.
bperiod I. represents the pre-deregulation period, period 11. indicates the early postderegulation period, while period Ill represents the most recent post-deregulation period.
CMajor and national airlines.
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airlines were becoming more efficient, fuel costs were declining, and the economy was expanding. 47 Paradoxically,
the airline yield spreads between air and motor carriers
(Table 3) are now more unfavorable than during the oil
embargo and recession of 1973 (although air carriers are
much more fuel intensive than motor carriers). These results are consistent with the earlier comparisions for the
composite corporate yields in that airlines are now viewed
less favorably by the capital market.
C. Airline Bond Ratings Before and After Deregulation
As a final check on the results, Table 4 compares airline
bond ratings for the periods before deregulation with the
post-deregulation period. As shown in Table 4, a majority of both the major airlines and the nationals have suffered a decline in bond ratings during the postderegulation period. The bottom of Table 4 shows that
67 percent of the majors and 75 percent of the national/other category had a lower bond rating in 1984
than during either the 1973 oil embargo or the entire
1973-1977 pre-deregulation period. Furthermore, an inspection of the data indicates that a number of these carriers have experienced several downgradings in rating
during the post-deregulation period. In fact, only one
carrier, U.S.Air, has experienced a rating increase during
the recent post-deregulation periods.
The results of the examination of bond ratings are consistent with the earlier "spread analyses" in that airlines
are looked upon less favorably by the capital market following deregulation. Since many financial institutions use
a rating of "Ba" as the minimum standard for acceptable
investment risk,48 it is apparent from Table 4 that most
airlines no longer meet this minimum standard. The im47
48

INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Current Analysis, supra note 42, at A2-A3, A6-A7.
See West, supra note 31, at 163; Hettenhouse & Sartoris, supra note 31, at 65.
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TABLE 4
AIRLINE BOND RATINGS BEFORE AND
AFTER DEREGULATION (1973-1984)

Carrier
American Airlines
Braniff International
Continental Air Linesb
Eastern Air Linesb
Pan Am World
Trans World Corp.
United Air Lines
U.S.Air
Western Air Lines
Nationals and Others
Frontier Airlines
Hawaiian Airlinesb
Ozark Air Linesb
P.S.A.
Texas Intl. Air
World Airways
Flying Tiger
Seaboard World Airb
Totals
Percent No Change
Percent Increase
Percent Decrease

1973
Ratinga

Average Ratinga
1973-1977

1984
Ratinga

Rating
Change

Baa
Ba
Ba
B
Ba
Baa
Ba
B
Ba

Baa
Baa
Ba
B
Ba
Ba
Ba
B
Ba

Baa
Ca
C
Caa
B
Ba
B
Baa
Caa

No Change
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease
No Change
Decrease
Increase
Decrease

B

B
Caa
B
Ba
B
Ba
A
B

B
Ca
B
B
C
Caa
B
Caa

No Change
Decrease
No Change
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease

B
Ba

Baa
B
Maos

Nationals and Others

22% (2)
25% (2)
11% (1)
0% (0)
67% (6)
75% (6)
100% (9)
100% (8)
aMoody's corporate bond ratings are from highest to lowest: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba,
B, Caa, Ca, C. Bonds which are rated below "Ba" are generally considered to
"lack characteristics of the desirable investment."
bConvertible bonds.
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plication of these results is that deregulation has accompanied an increase in airline investment risk and therefore
an increase in the airlines' future debt costs.
IV.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The results of this study indicate that the capital market
is not enthusiastic about the prospects of the airline industry in a deregulated environment. Although the bond
market initially looked upon deregulation favorably, a reassessment of airline prospects began to take place during
the latter part of 1981 for both the major and national
carriers. Thus, the spreads between airline bond yields to
maturity and the composite indices of corporate, motor,
and rail bond yields deteriorated substantially during the
1981 through 1984 period. Furthermore, as of the end of
1984, a majority of both the major and national airlines
now have lower bond ratings than during the oil embargo/recession of 1973 to 1975. In sum, these results
suggest that the airline industry's future under deregulation looks bleak.
Much of the recent financial difficulty of the airline industry can be traced directly to the effects of deregulation
on rates and market entry. Although airlines have always
used price discounts to some extent, over the last few
years rate discounting has become rampant, particularly
on the long-haul, high-density routes. While prior to the
Act only 45 percent of all passengers travelled under discounted tickets, as of 1983 almost 90 percent of all passengers were travelling under discount.4 9 Since
approximately one-half of airline passengers are business
travellers 50 and since this market segment is relatively
price inelastic, 5 ' the heavy use of discounts appears highly
See INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at A28, A42.
- ALTHSULER & TEAL, supra note 37, at 54-55.
51 Id.
49
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TABLE 5
AIRLINE REVENUES PER PASSENGER-MILE
(YIELDS)
(YEAR-TO-YEAR PERCENTAGE CHANGES)
1983
1st Q

1981
4th Q

Ist Q

1982
3rd Q
2nd Q

American
Continental
Delta
Eastern
Northwest
Pan American
Republic
TWA
United
U.S.Air

- 1.7
+10.2
+12.3
+ 4.6
+ 2.8
- 3.9
- 3.2
+ 5.5
- 0.6
+ 8.7

-15.0
- 8.4
- 2.1
- 1.5
- 4.7
- 4.2
- 8.4
- 7.7
-14.0
+ 6.3

-11.5
-11.1
- 0.1
+ 3.2
- 6.6
+ 1.3
-14.3
- 5.6
- 6.5
+ 4.6

-

+ 3.5
+ 3.1
- 2.9
+ 2.2
-12.8
- 3.5
- 1.8
+ 6.7

-

7.2
3.1
-11.7
+ 8.5
-12.0
- 3.8
- 5.0
- 4.3

- 8.6
-12.3
-15.5
- 5.7
- 2.5
+ 2.1
-18.9
-13.6
- 8.1
- 6.8

Western

+ 1.4

+ 1.0

-11.4

-

-12.0

-19.3

12.4
+ 1.7
+ 8.0
- 1.8
+ 8.6

-

+
-

+ 3.4
- 9.2
- 5.8
-10.9
- 5.1

-

+ 4.5
-20.9

4th Q

Major Airlines
2.6

7.4

-

-

-

2.4

National Airlines
Air Florida
Frontier
Ozark
PSA
Southwest

9.3
0.8
1.5
2.9
4.3

9.8
9.1
5.3
3.2
8.7

9.6

-

-

-

5.8

-

-

- 7.7
+ 1.8

MAJOR AIRLINES AVERAGE TON-MILE AND BREAKEVEN LOAD
FACTORS (1974-1982)
No. Total TonAverage
Average TonMiles
No. Total
Breakeven TonMile Load
Passengers
Passengers &
Mile Load
Factor Pass. &
Freight
Carried
Factorbc
Deficit
(millions)a
Frt.b
(thousands)a
(C-D)
(C)
(D)
(A)
(B)
- .9%
52.9%
53.8%
208,432
21,046
1982
- 1.4%
52.3%
20,537
50.9%
1981
205,363
50.9%
- .4%
21,199
50.5%
1980
221,979
1.0%
54.2%
53.2%
211,554
21,257
1979
48.9%
3.7%
19,712
52.6%
1978
196,073
2.5%
48.8%
46.3%
1977
172,231
17,348
- .7%
48.3%
49.0%
1976
160,451
16,171
.0%
46.6%
46.6%
14,794
1975
147,428
45.0%
2.2%
47.2%
147,999
14,699
1974
Source:

STANDARD

AND POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS,

Aerospace and Air Transport,

Current and Basic Analysis, June 30 and December 1, 1983.
aDomestic scheduled
bTotal operations. Braniff and Continental eliminated for 1982.
cThe percent of available capacity that must be sold to cover all expenses for
passengers and freight.
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questionable as a sound business practice. Furthermore,
because of such practices, complaints of predatory pricing
or objectionable price discrimination abound.5 2 For example, as of 1983 it cost more to fly from Buffalo to Albany than from Buffalo to Boston via Albany in the same
plane at the same time. 53 In such cases, the short-haul
passengers are subsidizing the discounts for the long-haul
passengers.
Table 5 also highlights some of these destructive pricing practices in the post-deregulation period. The tophalf of Table 5 indicates the substantial decline in airline
revenue yields (passenger revenue per passenger mile)
over the last few years. In its essence, the upper portion
of Table 5 reveals that airlines were carrying more passengers at a loss. Similarly, the bottom-half of Table 5 shows
that while airlines have increased their load factors in the
54
post-deregulation period, their breakeven load factors
have increased at a faster rate, resulting in deficits. The
lower portion of Table 5 also suggests the unprofitable
nature of much of airline pricing, which in turn is reflected by the capital market's asessment of the industry's
prospects.
One question posed by the results of this research is
why airlines would require some form of regulatory protection. The answer lies in the public interest nature of
the industry5 5 and its inherent tendencies toward instability and destructive competition because of certain eco52 Gieseking, Cloudy Skies for U.S. Airlines, TRAVEL HOLIDAY, July 1982 at 69;
Bernstein, Rumblings of Reregulation, FORTUNE, January 10, 1983, at 17, 18; INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Current Analysis, supra note 42, at A3-A4. The Airline Deregulation
Act prohibits predatory pricing but doesn't specifically define it. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1482(d)(4) (1982).
- Bernstein, supra note 52, at 17.
54 A "breakeven load factor" is the percent of available capacity that must be
sold to cover all expenses. During 1982 and 1983, the breakeven load factor on
some airline routes was over one hundred percent, which precludes carrier profits. See, INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Current Analysis, supra note 42, at A5.
55 Lloyd-Jones, Deregulationand Its PotentialEffect on Airline Operations, 41 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 815, 836 (1975); Russell, The CAB and the Consumer, 40J. AIR L. & COM. 51
(1974).
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nomic characteristics it possesses. 5 ' The airline industry
was originally regulated because of industry instability
and the potential for destructive competition. As a 1938
House Report stated:
The result of this chaotic situation of the air carriers has
been to shake the faith of the investing public in their financial stability and to prevent the flow of funds into the
industry. Unless legislation is enacted which would give
carriers reasonable assurance of the permanency of their
operation and would protect them from cut-throat competition, a number of the airlines will soon be in serious financial trouble.58
The latter statement, of course, has a contemporary and
"familiar ring" to it.
Several economic characteristics of the airline industry
in particular tend to promote instability and destructive
competition in the absence of regulatory moderation.
First, it is well known that airline demand is highly varia59
ble as to time of day, time of month, and time of year
and that the transportation output can neither be stored
nor inventoried. 60 In addition, different travelling segments exhibit different price elasticities of demand (for
example, business travel versus vacation travel); 61 once a
plane is scheduled, however, most of the costs are fixed in
56

J. KNEAFSEY, J. MOLLOY, R. SIMPSON, & N. TANEJA, THE NEED FOR STABILITY

IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY MARKET STRUCTURE: DEREGULATION AFTER FOUR YEARS

30-33 (1983).
57

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT OF THE

TORY REFORM

CAB

SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULA-

20 (July 1975) [hereinafter cited as CAB Report]. Lloyd-Jones,

supra note 55, at 815; Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1001, 1002 (1980); Callison, Airline Deregulation-Only Partially A
Hoax: The Current Status of the Airline DeregulationMovement, 45J. AIR L. & COM. 961,
962-67 (1980); Breyer & Stein, supra note 6, at 10-13.
58 H. R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 2 (1938).
59 For a statistical representation of this demand variability, see W. O'CONNOR,
AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE ECONOMICS 65-67 (1978). See also Thornton, Deregu-

lation: The CA.B. and its Critics, 43J. AIR L. & COM. 641, 650 (1977).
- Lloyd-Jones, supra note 55, at 837; G. DOUGLAS &J. MILLER, ECONOMIC

REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY 4, 45 (1974).
61 P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 37, at 153; S. SHAW, AIR TRANSPORT 154 (1982).
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the short-run.6 2 Hence, airlines have a natural incentive
to price incrementally or to use some form of price discrimination. To work effectively, however, competitive
devices such as stand-by discounts and minimum-stay discounts, require that an airline have the ability to separate
different market segments for pricing purposes. Some
economists have long suggested that over time, airlines
have great difficulty in effectively separating traffic and
market segments in an open entry/open pricing environment. 63 In fact, the current situation of almost ninety percent of all passengers flying under some type of discount
lends credence to this view. 64
Second, it is difficult to accurately forecast the future
demand for airline services and to match future capacity
to this forecasted demand. Airline demand is highly susceptible to swings in the economy,65 and is income elastic
(depends on the income levels of travelers).66 Much
travel, especially near holidays, is similar to a postponable
durable.67 Moreover, there is a long leadtime between
equipment orders and their receipt. 68 For example, the
wide-bodied jets were ordered at a time of optimistic demand forecasts and stable fuel prices. When the orders
were finally received, neither existed. 69 The difficulty in
forecasting demand alone tends to promote excess capacity in the industry which in turn can cause destructive
price competition in the absence of regulatory con62 S. SHAW, supra note 61, at 93; Thornton, supra note 59, at 84; Brenner, The
Need for Continued Regulation of Air Transportation,41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 794 (1975).

63 S. SHAW, supra note 61, at 167; R. KANE & A. VOSE, supra note 37, at 10-14; N.

TANEJA, supra note 19, at 126-31; Altshuler & Teal, supra note 37 at 54-55; Thayer,
Comparative Research in Transportation; Methodology Without Theory, in 2 UNITED
STATES DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION: CONFERENCE ON REGULATORY REFORM IN SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 121, 124 (Mar. 1983).

supra note 8, at A28, A42.
Ellison, supra note 38, at 60.
- P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 37, at 18, 22; Breyer & Stein, supra note 6, at 8.
- INDUSTRY SURVEYS,

65

67

P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 37, at 29.

- R. MANDELL, FINANCING THE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY IN THE 1980's at xvi, 12 (1979).
69 See Thornton, supra note 59, at 643.
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straints. In addition, the problem of excess capacity 70 is
likely to become worse as more airport slots become available in the aftermath of the air traffic controllers' strike. 7 '
Third, most airline markets are characterized by oligopolistic conditions in that such markets can reasonably
support only a limited number of competitors.7 2 Such a
situation would normally result in "sticky" prices. 73 But
airline markets are also characterized by unusually low
short-term barriers to entry which can engender excess
capacity and destructive competition. Market entry is relatively easy since (1) airline transportation is largely undifferentiated in the minds of consumers (and therefore is
price sensitive),74 (2) airline productive equipment can
readily be redeployed (high factor mobility), 75 and (3) second-hand aircraft are readily available (low-leasing cost or
direct investment costs).76
Given the cost structure of the industry and the absence
of significant barriers to market entry, unrestrained price
competition could potentially have deleterious effects on
all carriers. For example, in 1982 and 1983, Delta Airlines attempted to resist widespread discounting on many
of its routes. The net result was a loss of market share.
Delta's pricing policy was thereafter modified to meet all
competitor discounts, resulting in unprofitably low prices
for this traditionally healthy airline.77 In short, the low
barriers to entry in the airline industry and the limited
number of competitors which individual markets can sup70 See generally Thayer, And Now the Deregulators: When Will They Learn?, 43J. AIR
L. & CoM. 661, 671-72. (1977).

7, See STANDARD AND POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Air Transport, CurrentAnalysis, 48

(Mar. 4, 1982); Thayer, supra note 63, at 133.
72 Thornton, supra note 59, at 665-67; P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 37, at 103, 150.
73 Thornton, supra note 59, at 656.
7. loyd-Jones, supra note 55, at 830; W. O'CONNOR, supra note 59, at 5-6.
75 S. SHAW, supra note 61, at 92; W. O'CONNOR, supra note 59, at 5-6; C.A.B.
REPORT, supra note 57, at 120; Lloyd-Jones, supra note 55, at 838.
70 BREYER & STEIN, supra note 6, at 8; Oster, The New EntrantAirlines: Implications
for Transportation Regulatory Reform, in UNITED STATES DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION,
CONFERENCE ON REGULATORY REFORM IN SURFACE TRANSPORT 324-25 (June 1983);
INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at 41.
77 INDUSTRY SURVEYS, CurrentAnalysis, supra note 42, at 3-4.
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port tend to promote excess capacity and destructive
price competition.78
Fourth, other economic characteristics can also provoke
industry instability. Harm can possibly be done to integrated route systems (balkanization) and interdependent
industries by new non-union entrants. 79 Additionally, the
"S curve phenonmenon" suggests that firms will compete
in terms of excess capacity because the airline with the
greatest number of flights will receive a proportionally
greater market share.8 0 Finally, some travel agents or arrangers may have the ability to exercise leverage in obtaining revenue commissions. 8 ' While any one of the
preceding economic characteristics might occur in another industry, they are aggregated only in the airline industry. Thus, absent some limited regulation, these
economic characteristics tend to promote destructive
competition in an industry vested with a public interest in
commerce, national defense, and safety.
V.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

The previous section and the results of this study suggest that destructive price competition and objectionable
price discrimination can be traced directly to deregulation
and the unique economic characteristics of the airline industry. These economic characteristics relate to continuing tendencies toward excess capacity, low natural
barriers to market entry, markets which can support only
78 Lloyd-Jones,
supra note 55, at 839; Oster, supra note 75, at 400; W.
O'CONNOR, supra note 59, at 5-6; Heymsfeld, An Introduction to Regulatory Reform for
Air Transportation, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 665, 671 (1975).
79 Lloyd-Jones, supra note 55, at 822, 825, 828; S. SHAW, supra note 61, at 93;
Thayer, supra note 63, at 128; N. TANEJA, supra note 19, at 129; INDUSTRY SURVEYS,

supra note 8, at A34.
so W. FRUHAN, JR., THE FIGHT FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE:

A STUDY OF THE

UNITED STATES DOMESTIC TRUNK AIR CARRIERS 126-129 (1972); P. Biederman,

supra note 37, at 26, 48, 153, 169-170.
a' In 1982 travel agents sold approximately two-thirds of airline tickets; travel
commissions represented 6.4 percent of total airline operating costs, compared to
3.5 percent in pre-deregulation periods. See AIRLINE ECONOMICS supra note 9, at
196, 205; S. SHAW, supra note 61, at 182-86; Thornton, supra note 59, at 658;
INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at A43.
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a limited number of competitors, and an inability of the
airlines to segregate price sensitive segments of the market from other market segments over time. Furthermore,
recessionary conditions also exacerbate industry
problems. Absent some form of regulatory moderation,
these economic conditions will promote destructive price
competition, cross-subsidization of markets, and industry
instability. As a result, the financial market is not enthusiastic about the airline industry's prospects in a completely deregulated environment.
The recent financial difficulty of the airline industry and
the foregoing economic observations commend some
form of regulation of airline practices. Such proposals are
emanating from several sources.82 Two proposals which
would deal directly with the problem of excess airline capacity, and thus destructive price competition, favor
either a reimposition of entry controls or the collective
adjustment of flight schedules by the airlines themselves.
In regard to entry controls, it is unlikely that governmental policy would ever again directly limit the number of
competitors by returning to the restrictive certification
process of the past. It has recently been suggested, however, that the United States Department of Transportation ration or "auction-off' airport slots to eliminate
congestion at airports.83 This policy, of course, would
limit entry and would indirectly reduce excessive price
competition.
In regard to the joint scheduling of services, one recommendation would provide American air carriers with
82 Bernstein, Rumblings of Reregulation, FORTUNE,Jan. 10, 1983, at 17; Ott, Boeing
Official Decries Industry's Condition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 31, 1983, at 28;
Glines, Deregulation, the Bomb That Exploded, AIR LINE PILOT, Nov. 1983, at 16;
Gieseking, Cloudy Shies for U. S. Airlines, TRAVEL HOLIDAY, July 1982, at 69; Gregory, Airlines in Endless Transition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 14, 1983, at 19;
Congress May Reconsider Deregulation, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1983, at
194; AFL-CIO Demands End to DeregulationofAir Industry and Anti-Union Acts, TRAFFIC
WORLD, Dec. 12, 1983, at 26; S. SHAW, supra note 61, at 235; N. TANEJA, AIRLINE
PLANNING: CORPORATE, FINANCIAL AND MARKETING 6-7, 121 (1982).
83 INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at A28. See also DOT on Slot Allocations, TRAFFIC WORLD, June 6, 1983, at 8; and Ott, supra note 81, at 29.
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antitrust immunity to jointly discuss and adjust their flight
departures, arrivals, and schedules.84 Such a proposal
would be similar to the Canadian airline policy of "cooperation" where competing carriers have recently been allowed to "rationalize their services" by providing joint
scheduling of equipment, interconnection of flights, joint
handling at airports, and cooperative marketing of the
services.85 The purported advantages of this policy to
consumers are more stable prices, more direct flights to
destination (yet fewer flights to choose from), and a
greater selection of departure times since most airlines
currently schedule flights during peak periods.8 6 The disadvantages to consumers are fewer deep discounts and
less price competition since fewer carriers would be competing between origin and destination points. For the airlines, the major advantages would be a reduction in
destructive price competition, better capacity utilization,
increased load factors, improved interconnected scheduling, and most importantly, an improvement in financial
performance.
It is noteworthy, however, that even during the restrictive CAB regulatory periods of the past, collective reductions in capacity were not allowed.88
Consequently, as with the proposal for regulatory entry
controls, the likelihood of discussions among competing
airlines over joint scheduling is not great.
An additional, and preferable, proposal relates to airline pricing practices. While rate controls would not eliminate the industry's excess capacity, they would relieve the
symptomatic problems of destructive price competition,
objectionable price discrimination, and the precarious financial position of the industry.8 9 Although few airline
84 Airlines Urge CAB to Reject Antitrust Bid, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 27,
1983, at 30-31.
85 Ellison, Simpson, & Smith, Co-operation:A Pragmatic Response by CanadianAirlines to 'Deregulation',24 TRANSP. RESEARCH F. 675 (1983).
8. Id. at 679.
87

Id. at 677.

88

See Airlines Urge CAB to Reject Antitrust Bid, supra note 83, at 30-31.

89

J. KNEAFSEY, J. MOLLOY, R.

SIMPSON,

& N.

TANEJA, supra note

56, at 49-50;
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observers would recommend a return to the overly restrictive price regulations of the past, one useful approach
for the future would be "regulation by exceptions." Several variations of this concept exist, but essentially, such
an approach would involve limited regulatory rate controls over exceptions or specific deviations from some
standard, preferably cost-related base rate. Thus, rather
than regulatory deliberations on all airline rate filings,
consideration would only be given to serious departures
from the standard or norm. After outlining a number of
variations on this concept, the benefits and disadvantages
of a "regulation by exceptions" approach will be
addressed.
First, a "regulation by exceptions" approach might entail a "zone of rate flexibility" or "zone of reasonableness" in which airlines could raise or lower rates without
regulatory interference. Such a proposal could be easily
implemented. Initially, the Airline Deregulation Act provided for such a "zone" where rates could be raised 5
percent or lowered 50 percent annually without CAB approval. 90 However, even this initial zone was substantially
wider than the zones established for motor carriers (up 10
percent or down 10 percent) and rail carriers (an adjustment of 6 percent) under their respective, more limited
deregulation legislation. 9' Now of course,
there are no
92
pricing.
airline
in
changes
on
limitations
If the motor carrier "model" were adopted, the most
important statutory provisions would involve the definition of the standard "base rate," limitations on changes
within the zone, and adjustments for competitive and inflationary conditions.9" The agency regulating motor
carriers, the Interstate Commerce Commission (CommisCortley, The Industry in Crisis: The Overcapacity Paradox, AIR LINE PILOT, Feb. 1984,
at 14.
- Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)(4) (1982).
91 Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d)(1) (1982); Staggers Rail Act
of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10707(a) (1982).
02 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)(1-4) (1982).
In Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d)(1-4)(1982).
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sion), is prohibited from interfering with a proposed rate
on the basis that it is too high or too low if the rate is not
more than 10 percent above or below a specified point of
reference.94 This base rate or standard is defined as the
rate in effect one year prior to the effective date of the
proposed rate. The limitations on the carrier changes
within the zone require the carrier to notify the Commission that it wishes to have the rate considered under the
"zone of rate freedom" provisions, that the carrier acts
independently of other carriers, and that no antitrust immunity will cover rates set within the zone. 9 5 An adjustment for competitive conditions allows the Commission
to increase the zone up to 5 percentage points during any
one year period if it finds that there is sufficient actual or
potential competition to regulate rates and that the carriers, shippers, and public will benefit from increased rate
flexibility.96 Adjustments can also be made for inflation
by making the base rate (i.e., the rate in effect one year
prior to the effective date of the proposed rate) reflect
changes during the past year in the Producers Price Index
as published by the Department of Labor. 7
If the rail "model" were followed, the relevant issues
would again center around the calculation of the standard
base rate, conditions for use of the zone, and adjustments
for competition and inflation.98 In the rail model, the
base rate is defined as the rate in effect on the first day of
an applicable five-year period. 99 This base rate is "adjusted" by a rail "cost adjustment factor" which factors in
changes in the costs of material and labor over time. Carriers are allowed individual rate adjustments up to the
"adjusted base rate" plus 6 percent per year. 00 After
1984, the zone dropped to 4 percent per year and is only
- Id. § 10708(d)(1).
95 Id. § 10708(d)(4).
97

Id. § 10708(d)(2).
Id. § 10708(d)(3).

98 Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10707(a) (1982).
Id. § 10707(a)(1).
- Id. § 10707(b)(1).
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available to carriers with inadequate earnings.' 0 ' Finally,
the zone of flexibility cannot be used for rates which are
more than 20 percent above a threshold rate which is discussed below. 102 Although the zone of flexibility does not
directly deal with competitive and inflationary conditions,
under another provision of the deregulation legislation,
the Interstate Commerce Commission can use an "inflation index" to prescribe quarterly percentage rate increases on an0 3industry-wide, territory-wide, or individual
carrier basis.'
Under a variation of the "regulation by exceptions" approach, like that imposed on rail carriers, a "rate floor"
and "rate ceiling" could be established for airline rates.
In the case of railroad deregulation, the "rate floor" was
defined as "any rate which contributed to the going concern value" of the firm, while any rate greater than "variable costs" was presumed to be reasonable and to
contribute to "going concern value."'' 0 4 The rate, however, may be challenged on grounds other than reasonableness, such as discrimination. 0 5 To determine the
"rate ceiling," all rail rates initially below 160 percent of
variable costs were also deemed to be reasonable. 10 6 This
threshold will increase by formula over time until the
Commission determines that rail carriers are earning adequate revenues.
Given the economic characteristics of the airline industry which make it difficult to define variable costs because
the identification of costs that vary with changes in output
is extremely sensitive to the time horizon, a more appropriate means of setting "standard fare" rates would be
based on total costs. Rates would then deviate from this
standard only within narrow limits. This proposal would
also eliminate instances of objectionable price discriminato, Id. § 10707a(d).
102

103

Id. § 10707(e)(2).
Id. § 10712(a).

1- Id. § 10701(c).

,o0
Id. § 10701(c)(3).
- Id. § 10709(d).
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tion. Originally, the Airline Deregulation Act provided
for such a "standard fare;" however, it was not
mandatory.107
A final form of "regulation by exceptions" can be derived by combining several of the preceding options into
one single proposal. As a specific example, Professors
Kneafsey, Molloy, Simpson, and Taneja of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have recently outlined a
three-part proposal for future limited rate regulation of
the airlines.' 08 Their proposal would involve (1) mileage
based base rates; (2) a 25 percent zone of rate flexibility;
and (3) an "exceptions zone" requiring regulatory approval. Specifically, they propose that each airline file a
distance-based fare structure for a basic service (e.g.,
coach). These rates must be on file for sixty days and
would not be subject to regulatory investigation or suspension. Rates for shorter distances must not exceed
rates for longer trips and there must be no personal discrimination or contractual arrangements. Individual market exceptions to the distance-based rates would be
allowed up to some specified percentage (i.e., plus or minus 25 percent). These exceptions would be filed thirty
days in advance. Any competing carrier could match the
rates on short notice. Other fares outside the limits on
market deviation would be filed subject to government
approval. To gain approval, the carrier would have to explain why a particular market should be granted a deviation outside the prescribed deviations.' 0 9
While the exact details of a "regulation by exceptions"
approach can be debated, the advantages of such a proposal would be significant. By having regulation focus on
rate "exceptions," the benefits of competition could be
preserved while simultaneously rationalizing and stabilizing airline pricing." 0 Although limited rate regulation
107
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Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)(4) (1982).
KNEAFSEY, J. MOLLOY, R. SIMPSON, & N. TANEJA, supra note 56, at 51-52.
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will not eliminate the industry's excess capacity, it would
alleviate one of its major symptoms-destructive price
competition. Furthermore, limited regulation would
thwart objectionable personal discrimination and crosssubsidization between travel markets or communities
since rates would be based on definitive standards such as
costs or distances. Consumers would also be more certain
about the level of fares, and airlines would once again
earn normal profits. The major disadvantages are that
some regulatory involvement would be required and consumers would not have the temporary advantage of some
deep discounts which have been available in the past.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

At a time when the airlines must raise huge sums of capital to replace aging equipment,"' this study indicates
that the capital market is not enthusiastic about the airlines' prospects. Consequently, airline future debt costs
have risen substantially relative to the debt costs of other
businesses in the general market and relative to debt costs
of other modes of transportation. Since these other enterprises have also been affected by similar economic conditions, the capital markets reflect that the airline industry
will continue to face hardships in a deregulated environment. As outlined in section III of this paper, much of
the recent financial difficulty of the airline industry can be
attributed directly to the destructive price competition
made possible by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
Financial problems have arisen because of the special economic characteristics of the airline industry, particularly
DOT's View of Airline Deregulation Challenged by Small Cities, Labor, TRAFFIC WORLD,
June 20, 1982, at 16-17.
M See, e.g., Income Uncertainty Slows Airline Fleet Replacement, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 3, 1984, at 168. Ithas been estimated that the airline industry must
raise approximately $90 billion in the 1980's to replace equipment. It has also
been estimated that a 5 percent return on revenue (net profit margin) will be required for airlines to attract sufficient capital to accomplish this equipment replacement and for growth. Such a return has not been achieved since 1978 (Table
1). See AIRLINE ECONOMICS supra note 9, at xx, 114; N. TANEJA, supra note 19, at
178; R. MANDELL, supra note 68, at 111; INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 8, at 41.
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tendencies toward excess capacity, low barriers to entry,
and markets which can reasonably support only a limited
number of competitors.
While few industry observers would recommend a return to the comprehensive and restrictive regulatory policies of the past, the results of this study indicate that some
limited form of regulation might be appropriate. As outlined in the previous section, it would be possible to reinstitute a limited form of entry controls, for example, by
rationing airport slots or by controlling the frequency of
airline flight departures. Alternatively, airlines could be
allowed to rationalize their own services by collectively
"cooperating" in adjusting their flight schedules. Both of
these options would directly deal with the problem of excess capacity as well as reduce congestion at airports.
Since both would involve restricting the number of competitors in certain markets, however, the desirability of
these policy options are open to question.
A policy preferred by the author would involve "regulation by exceptions," emphasizing regulatory rate involvement only for significant departures from the standard or
norm. Although such a policy would not directly eliminate the industry's excess capacity, it would alleviate one
of its major symptoms-destructive price competition.
Consequently, a "regulation by exceptions" policy would
preserve the major benefits of competition while reducing
excessive discounts, objectional price discrimination, and
industry instability.
While the exact details of a "regulation by exceptions"
approach can be debated, several variants of the concept
were explored. One alternative would be to reinstitute a
"zone of rate flexibility" in which carriers could adjust
rates by some specified percentage without regulatory interference. Key issues to be resolved would be definition
of the base rate, width of the zone, and periodic adjustments for inflation and competitive conditions. Second, a
"rate floor" and "ceiling" could be defined for airline
rates similar to that imposed on rail carriers. In the case
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of railroad deregulation, both the "floor" and "ceiling"
were related to variable costs.1 2 Because of the difficulty
of accurately defining variable costs in the airline industry,
requiring that airline rates conform to a mileage-based
fare structure might be more appropriate. This would
also eliminate instances of objectionable personal and
place discrimination. Alternatively, rates could be tied to
a total cost-based "standard fare" and only be allowed to
deviate from this standard within narrow limits.
Although these alternatives do not exhaust the number
of possible options, some form of "regulation by exceptions" should be adopted in order to rationalize airline
pricing. In fact, it would be possible to combine several
of these options into one single proposal as outlined in
the previous section of this paper. In the absence of some
limited form of regulatory intervention, one can expect
airline performance to continue to deteriorate in the years
ahead. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he interest of
the consumer is by no means always in opposition to that
of the airlines. Indeed, it certainly can be argued that the
public has a great stake in having profitable airlines that
can offer safe, efficient service and have the capital to in' 3
vest in new and better aircraft." "
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